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72 ESCHWW V. STATE BAR [24 C.2d 
private reprimand, adding that "while petitioner has been 
dilatory in attending to his client's litigation, and with par-
ticular reference to his failure to supply the missing docu-
ment, or advise his client or associate counsel of its disap-
pearance, we feel there is no moral turpitude involved, and 
. . . we are inclined to believe the neglect in this particular 
matter was contributed to by the serious illness at that time 
of his wife and the removal of his offices from Tule Lake to 
San Francisco." The Board of Governors adopted the com-
mittee's findings, but recommended that petitioner be sus-
pended from practice for a period of six months. 
We are of the opinion that a reprimand, as recommended by 
the local committee, is sufficient discipline under the circum-
stances, and this opinion shall constitute such reprimand. 
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.-The only dereliction of pro-
fessional duty charged to the petitioner in the findings of 
fact made by the local administrative committee and adopted 
by the Board of Governors is that he neglected his client's 
business. This finding, considered in connection with the 
committee's conclusions stated in the form of a "recommen-
dation, " certainly does not show any conduct which justifies 
disciplinary action under the rules heretofore laid down by 
this court. (Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Ca1.2d 580 [122 P.2d 
549]; Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Ca1.2d 550 [107 P.2d 10]; 
Waterman v. State Bar, 8 Ca1.2d 17 [63 P.2d 1133] ; Marsh 
v. State Bar, 2 Cal.2d 75 [39 P.2d 403] ; Marsh v. State Bar, 
210 Cal. 303 [291 P. 583].) Accordingly, in my opinion, the 
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A. A. SEKT, Petitioner, V. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
MARIN COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Oriminal Law-Justices' Courts-Appeal-Record_Eft'ect of 
Delay in Filing.-A superior court has no authority to dismiss 
a criminal appeal from a justice's Court on the ground that the 
statement on appeal and the transcript had not been filed 
within the time required by rules of the Judicial Council, 
where the trial court had denied the People's motion to termi-
nate the proceedings on appeal, notwithstanding the fact that 
the delay had been occasioned by the appellant's neglect in re-
questing the preparation of the transcript and. his difficulties 
in connection with the fees of the reporters, and where the 
trial court's failure to settle the statement and transcript and 
to transmit the record to the superior court was not charge-
able to the appellant. 
[2] Mandamus-Hearing and Determination-Scope of Relief.-
Although a petitioner demands an inappropriate prerogative 
writ, the Court may grant such relief as is warranted by the. 
facts shown; and where petitioner sought a peremptory writ 
of mandate to compel the superior court to hear and deter-
mine a criminal appeal, to which he was not entitled because 
neither the statement on appeal nor the transcript had been 
settled, but he stated facts entitling him to annulment of an 
order dismissing the appeal, that relief was granted. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Marin County to hear and determine an appeal from a jus-
tice's court. Order dismissing appeal annulled. 
Leo R. Friedman for Petitioner. 
A. E. Bagshaw for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-Following the conviction and sentence of 
A. A. Sekt in the Justice's Court of San Rafael, he med a 
(1] See 8 Oal.Jur. 676. 
McK. Dig. Reference: (1] Criminal Law, § 1509; [2] Mandamus, § 100. 
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written notice of appeal. Upon motion, the superior court 
dismissed the appeal upon the ground that it had not been 
perfected within the time required by the rules of the J udi-
cial Council. The question for decision, presented by the 
petition of Sekt for a writ of mandate requiring the superior 
court to hear and determine the appeal, concerns the author-
ity of that court to make the challenged order. 
The petitioner filed his notice of appeal on March 30th. 
On the same day he was granted until April 19th within 
which to prepare and file a statement and the transcript on 
appeal. The twenty days fixed by this order is the maximum 
time which may be allowed by the justice's court for the 
preparation of the record upon aweal. (Rules of the Judi-
cial Council in the matter of Criminal Appeals to the Su-
perior Court from Inferior Courts; rules 4 and 6.) On 
April 24th, five days late, the petitioner filed his statement 
upon appeal specifying the ground, among others, that the 
evidence is insufficient to support either the verdict or the 
judgment. The statement declares that the insufficiency of 
the evidence is disclosed by the transcript of the evidence 
and proceedings had at the trial which "has been filed in 
said cause and said transcript by this reference is included 
in and made a part of this statement on appeaL" 
It appears from the stipulation of the District Attorney of 
Marin County and counsel for Sekt, upon which the superior 
court determined the motion to dismiss, that at the time the 
statement on appeal was filed the reporter's transcript had 
not been prepared. Because of the delay in filing the tran-
script, on May 14th the district attorney moved the justice's 
court to terminate all proceedings upon the appeal and to 
carry the judgment into effect. The motion was denied. 
Other facts shown by the stipuiation are that, on May 24th, 
the transcript prepgred by them was filed in the superior 
court. Four days later, counsel for Sekt served a notice stat-
ing that on May 24th the transcript had been filed in the 
justice's court. 
It was on May 27th that the district attorney served and 
filed in the superior court a notice of motion to dismiss the 
appeal. Later he served an amended notice of his intention 
to make such a motion upon the ground that Sekt had failed 
to file his statement upon appeal or a transcript of the evi-
dence and proceedillgs as required by law. The motion, baSed' 
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upon the notice as amended, was heard and determined on 
June 18th. The parties' stipulation recites that the tran-
script remained on file in the superior court until shortly 
prior to the date of the hearing when it was withdrawn and 
filed with the justice's court. So far as the record shows, 
neither the statement nor the transcript has been Rettled. 
The petitioner contends that the rules of the Judicial Coun-
cil are not jurisdictional and a failure to comply with them 
does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction to hear 
an appeal from an inferior court upon the merits where 
noncompliance is excusable. He urges that he has done all 
in his power to perfect the appeal and should not be penal-
ized for delay based upon orders of the justice's court extend-
ing time occasioned by the irregular extensions of time granted 
by the justice's court to its official reporter. It is the duty 
of the trial court, he concludes, to determine whether delay 
justifies a termination of the proceedings to procure a record, 
and in the present case that question has been determined fa-
vorably to the petitioner. 
In support of its order, the respondent court asserts that 
because of the petitioner's failure to file the statement on 
appeal and the transcript within the time provided by the 
rules of the Judicial Council it has no jurisdiction to enter-
tain the appeal. But if compliance with the rules of the 
Judicial Council is not jurisdictional, it adds, the order 
granting the motion to dismiss was made in the exercise of 
its ,discretion to dismiss an appeal not prosecuted diligently 
or regularly, as authorized by rule 10, and that there was no 
abuse of discretion. 
Rule 4 of the rules of the Judicial Council regulating ap-
peals to the superior court in criminal cases, requires that 
the statement and transcript upon appeal must be served upon 
the respondent and filed with the trial court within five dayS 
after the filing of the notice of appeal. But by rule 6, the 
court from which the appeal is taken may extend the time 
for filing the statement and transcript to a maximum of 
twenty days from the date upon which the notice of appeal 
was filed. "As soon as the statement or transcript on appeal 
has been settled and certified," the rules further provide, 
"the clerk of the trial court or the judge thereof. if there 
be no clerk, shall forthwith transmit the record on appeal to 
"I, 
\. , , 
t'I' 
" 
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the clerk of the Superior Court to which the appeal is taken, 
together with all exhibits or other documents properly re-
ferred to and identified in the statement or transcript." 
(Rule 3, § 9.) In the present case the transcript was not 
filed with the trial court within the time specified by these 
provisions, nor even within the time as extended by the order 
made in violation of rule 6. But that court denied the Peo-
ple's motion to terminate the proceedings upon appeal; 
whether it has settled either the statement or transcript does 
110t appear. At the time the motion to dismiss the appeal 
was noticed, and also when it was heard and determined by 
the respondent court, the transcript had not been transmitted 
as required by rule 3. 
The rules of the Judicial Council authorize the dismissal 
of an appeal under these circumstances: "If the appeal is 
not brought to a hearing within the time limited, or the 
appellant otherwise fails to prosecute it with diligence, or if 
the appeal is irregular in any substantial respect, the Supe-
rior Court may, on motion of the respondent or on its own 
motion, after written notice to the appellant, order it dis-
missed." (Rule 10.) But the singular situation here shown 
is that although, according to the return of the superior court, 
at the time the motion to dismiss the appeal was heard and 
determined there was pending before it the appeal taken by 
Sekt, the record upon appeal had not been settled and the 
trial court had denied a motion to terminate the proceedings 
for obtaining it. 
The rules regulating appeals from the superior court which 
were superseded by the Rules on Appeal, effective July 1, 
1943, authorized the dismissal of an appeal upon the failure 
to file the record within the specified time. But under the 
former procedure, a motion of the respondent must have 
been based upon a certificate or affidavit" that no proceeding 
for a bill of exceptions or transcript under section 953a is 
pending in the trial court, and if no such proceeding was 
ever instituted that the time to institute the same has ex-
pired. " (Rule VI, Rules for Supreme Court and District 
Courts of Appeal.) The theory underlying this practice and 
the rules of court which have been in effect from time to 
time is that ordinarily whether the appellant has taken ac-
tion to perfect his appeal within due time is not a question 
for investigation and consideration in this court on amotion 
Apr. 1944] ~EKT V. ~UPERiOR COUR't 
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to dismiss the appeal. Such matters, it has been pointed out, 
may more properly be determined in the superior court. 
(Mill Valley v. Massachusetts etc. Co., 189 Cal. 52 [207 P. 
253] .) Accordingly, an order of the superior court denying 
a motion to terminate proceedings to procure a record is 
usually upheld. (Smith v. Jaccard, 20 Cal.App. 280 [128 
P. 1023, 1026].) "The question of whether due diligence 
has been exercised is one that necessarily rests largely in the 
discretion of the trial court and its determination of this 
question will not be disturbed unless it plainly appears that 
such discretion has been abused." (Wood v. Peterson Farms 
00., 131 Cal.App. 312, 315 [21 P.2d 468].) 
These principles are applicable to the facts which were 
presented to the superior court upon the motion to dismiss. 
True, it appears that there had been a long delay, occasioned 
by Sekt's neglect in requesting the preparation of the tran-
script and his difficulties in connection with the fees of the 
reporters. But his inattention had been excused by the trial 
court. Moreover, the trial court's failure to settle the state-
ment and transcript and to transmit the record to the supe-
rior court, so far as appears in the present proceeding, is not 
chargeable to the appellant., The motion to dismiss the ap-
peal should, therefore, have been denied. 
[2] Nevertheless, it is obvious that a peremptory writ of 
mandate requiring the superior court to hear and determine 
the appeal should not issue when neither the statement nor the 
transcript has been settled by the justice's court and it is 
conceivable that the record on appeal may never be trans-
mitted to the superior court. On the other hand, the chal-
lenged order effectively bars any consideration of the appeal 
if, as and when the record is transmitted by the trial court. 
The petitioner has therefore stated facts entitling him to an 
annulment of the order dismissing the appeal (Forten-
bury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 405 [106 P.2d 411] ; Rod-
man v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 262 [89 P.2d 109]). For 
although a petitioner demands an inappropriate prerogative 
writ, the court should grant such relief as is warranted by the 
facts shown. (Van Tiger v. Superior Court, 7 Ca1.2d 377, 
384 [60 P.2d 851] ; Traffic Truck Sales Co. v. Justice's Court, 
192 Cal. 377, 381 [220 P. 306]; Van Hoosear v. ROIilroad 
Commission, 189 Cal. 228, 236 [207 P. 903].) 
\ ~ \ i 
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The alternative writ of mandate is discharged; the order 
dismissing the appeal is annulled. 
Curtis, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur. The essential jurisdictional 
step in taking an appeal to the superior court is the filing of 
a notice of appeal within the time limited (rule 2, Criminal 
Appeals to the Superior Court*) but the record shall not be 
transmitted to the superior court unless and until it is set-
tled as provided by the rules (rules 3 and 8, Criminal Ap-
peals to the Superior Court*). The filing of the notice of 
appeal with the trial court within the time prescribed is 
jurisdictional and, even though the notice of appeal is filed 
in time, the appellant may lose his right to have the record 
transmitted to the higher court, but until the record is trans-
mitted, the superior court ordinarily will be in no position 
to entertain and pass upon a motion to dismiss. There is rio 
absolute time limit fixed for the perfecting and settlement 
of the record (rule 7, Criminal Appeals to the Superior 
Court*) and upon the showing before us it does not appear 
that the superior court had authority to dismiss the appeal; 
the trial court had denied the respondent's motion to termi~ 
nate the proceedings therein and that order is not subject 
to review in this proceeding. For a further discussion of the 
rules in question see People v. Carpenter (1939), 36 Cal.App. 
2d Supp. 760 [93 P.2d 276]. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. I subsC'rihf' to the view that 
appeals should, if possible, be heard on the merits; and that 
a dismissal for procedural default should only be ordered 
where the appellant is clearly at fault. If a motion to dismiss 
an appeal were made in this court under circumstances sim-
ilar to those shown by the record herein, denial of the motion 
would be reasonable, despite the fact that much of the delay 
was caused by appellant's own neglect in failing to com-
mence proceedings promptly, and to his subsequf'ntIy deliv-
ering bad checks to the reporter as ad vances on his fees. That 
this is a criminal appeal, that eventually appellant paid the 
-The' rules govern~ng criminal appeals to the superior court 
referred to above' ate those' which were in force at the time this 
proceeding originated. 
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reporter's fees, and that subsequent delays in settlement and 
certification of the record were not within his power to avoid, 
would ordinarily be persuasive reasons for leniency in rul-
ing on the motion. 
These considerations, however, are not before us. The 
motion to dismiss was not addressed to this court, and we are 
not deciding it. The motion was addressed to the superior 
court, in which the appeal was pending, and was granted by 
that court. We have recently pointed out that "the juris-
dictiooi of the superior court upon an appeal from a proc('ed. 
ing in a justice's court was the same as that of any appellate 
court unless the superior court sought to conduct a new trial. " 
(Portnoy v. Superior Oourt, 20 Cal.2d 375, 377 [125 P.2d 
487], restating the holding in Redlands High School Dist. v. 
Superior Oourt, 20 Ca1.2d 348 [125 P.2d 490].) Since the 
superior court in appeals from justices' courts is in fact an 
appellate court, with the usual appellate jurisdiction. its 
judgments of affirmance, reversal, or dismissal within its 
jurisdiction are free from review in another appellate court. 
There is no provision, by statute or rule, fora further appeal 
to or hearing in this court; and the determination by the 
superior court that the appellant was guilty of inexcusable 
neglect,' even if regarded as erroneous or harsh, was no more 
our concern than its determination of any substantive ques-
tion of law or fact. Our procedural system does not provide 
for an ultimate right of review of every controversy in this 
court, but instead gives finality to decisions of the various 
appellate courts, except in the situations in which hearings 
in the Supreme Court are permitted after decisions by the 
, District Court of Appeal. 
All this is implied in the majority decision and opinion, 
'which treats the application herein as a petition for a writ 
: of certiorari, and grants relief by annulling the order of dis-
. missal. The opinion therefore holds that the superior court 
exceeded its jurisdiction in making that order, notwithstand-
'ing the fact that the appellant was· admittedly guilty of 
, neglect and improper conduct in the proceedings for prep-
, aration of the record, and that the sole questioI1 was whether 
the resulting delays should be excused., The failure of an-
other appellate court to exercise leniency in favor of a· de-
faulting appellant can hardly be regarded as in excess of its 
juril,;diction. In the light of all of the facts disclosed, it can-
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not even be said with assurance that the superior court exer-
cised its discretion unwisely. 
The majority opinion nevertheless purports to find the 
superior court lacking in jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal 
by reason of the absence of an order of the trial (justice's) 
court "terminating proceedings for a record." It is said that 
the question whether the appellant is in default is one for 
the trial court and not for the appellate court to determine. 
If this view is correct, an important part of its appellate 
jurisdiction has been stripped from the appellate court, and 
given to justices of the peace, who are, in many cases, not 
lawyers. They may countenance delay of months-perhaps 
years-without any control by the superior court. Before we 
accept any such theory we ought to be assured that the law 
plainly demands it. Actually, the, law is clearly to the con-
trary. 
The former rule governing appeals to the Supreme Court 
or District Court of Appeal was that a motion to dismiss for 
failure to file a record would not be considered unless a 
motion to terminate proceedings for a record had first been 
made in the trial court and granted by that court. The rea· 
son was that the former Supreme Court rules fixed no time 
for filing of the record on appeal, and expressly made an 
order of termination a prerequisite to the motion to dismiss. 
(Former Supreme Court rule I, § 1, and rule VI; see Hahne-
mann v. Pacific G. & E. 00., 31 Cal.App.2d 692 [88 P.2d 
748]; Orocker v. Orocker, 76 Cal.App. 606 [245 P. 438].) 
The procedure on a motion to terminate, and the incidental 
appeal from an order of termination (see W.ood v. Peterson 
Farms 00., 214 Cal. 94 [3 P.2d 922] ; How"tand v. Howland, 
11 Cal.2d 20 [77 P.2d 475]) was a serious cause of delay ill 
the prosecution of appeals, and was eliminated from the new 
Rules on Appeal recently adopted by the Judicial Council 
(See Judicial Council Annotated Rules, p. 45; Witkin, Ne'lll 
OaUfornia Rules on A.ppeal, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 79, 127.) 
The rules governing criminal appeals from inferior courts 
to the superior court do not establish this procedure, either 
expressly or by implication. The attempt to apply it herein 
is by analogy only, and any justification for its introduction 
disappeared when the new Rules on Appeal were adopted. 
Rule 10(a) of the rules governing appeals to the superior 
court provides that if "the appellant otherwise fails to pros-
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of the respondent or on its own motion, after written notice 
to the appellant, order it dismissed." Nothing is said therein 
about a motion to terminate proceedings. Yet the majority 
opinion, without explanation, not only imposes on the superior 
court a procedure already abandoned in the other appellate 
courts, but makes that outmoded procedure jurisdictional. 
Neither reason nor authority can be found to sustain' this 
decision. 
If the superior court should arbitrarily dismiss an appeal 
where the uncontroverted evidence clearly established.com-
pliance by the. appellant with all applicableruies,.we.:rm.ght 
hold that its act was an unwarrantedrefusaltoasSri.niejuiis~ . 
diction, and issue mandate to compel it ,to. hear,.'tb.ecause. 
But where, as here, the record contains some ~:videncl},'of lack 
of diligence in prosecution of the appeal, the igranting, or re~ 
fusing relief to the appellant lie~ with the court to which the 
appeal was taken. If the rule for which this case stands were 
to be followed, every litigant whose' appeal wa.~(dismissed. for 
lack of diligent prosecution, in the superior' court or' appel. 
late department thereof, or in anyDistrictC.~tii',(ofAppeal, 
would be entitled to a writ of review in this court,for the 
purpose of determining whether the facts juStified the dis-
missal of the appeal. 
[L. A. No. 18736. In Bank. Apr. 6, 1944.] 
VERA LAWLESS, Appellant, v. A. A. CALAWAY, et aI., 
Res~ondents .. 
[1] Physicians-Malpractice-Standard of Care.~A physician or 
surgeon is required only to have the degree of learning and 
skill ordinarily possessed by practitioners of the medical pro-
fession in the same locality, and to exercise ordinary care 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Physicians and Surgeons, § 51(1); 
[2,10] Physicians and Surgeons, § 52(1); [3,7,13,14] Physicians 
and Surgeons, § 56(2); [4,5, 8J Physicians and Surgeons, § 56(3); 
[6] Physicians and Surgeons, § 52; [9] X-rays; [11] Witnesses, 
§ 93(1); [12] Physicians and Surgeons, § 56(1); [15] Appeal and 
Error, § 184; [16] Physicians and Surgeons, § 62; [17] Appeal and 
Error, § 188. ' ... 
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